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DEFINING THE LIMITS OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 
UNDER 28 U.S.C. $ 1367: A HEARTY WELCOME TO PERMISSIVE 
COUNTERCLAIMS 
by 
Michelle S. ~ imon* 
In 1990, Congress passed 28 U.S.C. j 1367, which combined the judge-made 
doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction into a new category, "supplemental 
jurisdiction. " Supplemental jurisdiction allows federal district courts with original 
jurisdiction to also have jurisdiction over all other claims that form part of the 
"same case or controversy under Article 1II of the United States Constitution." 
This Article analyzes supplemental jurisdiction over both permissive and 
compulsory counterclaims, before and ajier the codz~cation o f $  1367, by looking 
at the meaning of "same case or controversy." It then examines two Circuit Court 
opinions that have held permissive counterclaims may be subject to supplemental 
jurisdiction as part of the "same case or controversy" as the claim over which the 
court has original jurisdiction. The author concludes that recent opinions from the 
Second and Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeal have correctly recognized federal 
courts' ability to hear permissive counterclaims without independent jurisdiction. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1990, Congress added 5 1367 to Title 28 of the United States code,' 
which codified the judge-made doctrines of ancillary and pendent jurisdiction 
into a newly created category, "supplemental juri~diction."~ Under $ 1367, in 
any civil action where the district courts have original jurisdiction, the courts 
can have supplemental jurisdiction "over all other claims that are so related to 
claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the 
same case or controversy under Article 111 of the United States ~onstitution."~ 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) states the rule for compulsory 
co~nterclaims.~ A defendant must plead any counterclaim that "arises out of the 
transaction or occurrence" that forms the basis of the plaintiffs  claim^.^ 
Although the rule does not state the consequences of a defendant's failure to 
plead a compulsory counterclaim, courts have held that the failure to plead 
results in claim preclusion in a later l a ~ s u i t . ~  Courts have also held that if a 
claim satisfies the test for a compulsory counterclaim by "arising out of the 
same transaction or occurrence," then the claim naturally falls within the "same 
case or controversy" language of 28 U.S.C. 5 1367(a).' Therefore, 9 1367 
provides a jurisdictional basis for compulsory co~nterclaims.~ 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(b) states the rule for permissive 
 counterclaim^.^ Under the rule, "[a] pleading may state as a counterclaim any 
claim against an opposing party not arising out of the transaction or occurrence 
that is the subject matter of the opposing party's ~lairn."'~ Before the existence 
of 3 1367, many courts determined that because permissive counterclaims did 
Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, 9 310(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 
51 13 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. 9 1367 (2000)). 
28 U.S.C. 9 1367 (2000). 
28 U.S.C. 9 1367(a) ("Such supplemental jurisdiction shall include claims that 
involve the joinder or intervention of additional parties."). 
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a). 
Id. 
6 Cleckner v. Republic Van & Storage Co., 556 F.2d 766, 769 n.3, 772 (5th Cir. 1977) 
(infemng a bar to a later claim under the alternative theories of res judicata, waiver, or 
equitable estoppel); see also Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467,469 n.1 (1974); 
Pipeliners Local Union No. 798 v. Ellerd, 503 F.2d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 1974); Fagnan v. 
Great Cent. Ins. Co., 577 F.2d 418, 420 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1004 (1978). 
But see Bristol Farmers Mkt. & Auction Co. v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 589 F.2d 1214, 
1220 (3d Cir. 1978) (holding that while a claim not raised may be barred from consideration 
in litigation it is not also barred in later arbitration proceedings). 
' Saglioccolo v. Eagle Ins. Co., 112 F.3d 226, 233 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that a claim 
which arose out of the same transaction or occurrence formed part of the same Article I11 
case or controversy); see also Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 72 F.3d 1294, 1299 (7th 
Cir. 1995) (citing the Report of the Federal Courts Study Committee 47 (April 2, 1990) and 
finding that the statutory language proposed by the Committee would have allowed 
supplemental jurisdiction only for claims arising out of the same "transaction or occurrence"; 
noting the significance of the language of the statute as adopted that authorized supplemental 
jurisdiction as "coextensive with the 'case or controversy' requirement of Article III"). 
Saglioccolo, 112 F.3d at 233; Baer, 72 F.3d at 1301. 
FED. R. CIV. P. 13(b). 
l o  Id. 
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not "arise from the same transaction or occurrence," they required independent 
subject matter jurisdiction in order to be heard by the federal district court." 
However, 5 1367 explicitly extended the federal courts' authority to "all other 
claims" that are "so related. . . that they form part of the same case or 
controversy under Article I11 of the United States ~onstitution."'~ The statute 
expands supplemental jurisdiction to its constitutional limits. As a result, it is 
no longer clear that permissive counterclaims require independent jurisdiction. 
Even if the counterclaim does not "arise out of the same transaction or 
occurrence" as the opposing party's claim, it still may fall within the broader 
constitutional requirement of "same case or con t ro~ers~ . " '~  
14 The Seventh Circuit, in Channell v. Citicorp National Services, Inc., and 
15 
more recently the Second Circuit in Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., have 
addressed this issue, holding that permissive counterclaims may be subject to 
supplemental jurisdiction under 5 1367.16 This Article will examine these 
opinions by looking at the scope of 5 1367, the purposes of supplemental 
jurisdiction, and the meaning of "same case or controversy" within the statute. 
The Article will specifically analyze supplemental jurisdiction over both 
permissive and compulsory counterclaims before and after the codification of 
5 1367 by looking at the meaning of "same transaction or occurrence." Finally, 
the Article will analyze the opinions in Channell and Jones, and will conclude 
that the courts correctly found that "same transaction or occurrence" is 
narrower than the constitutional limits of "case or controversy." 
11. THE NEED FOR SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 
The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.17 The federal courts 
only have subject matter jurisdiction over claims where there is both 
constitutional and congressional authority.18 Situations frequently arise where 
- - 
' I  But see Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 990-91 (3d Cir. 
1984). 
l 2  28 U.S.C. $ 1367(a) (2000). 
l 3  See Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205, 212-13 (2d Cir. 2004); Channell 
v. Citicorp Nat'l Servs., Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 385-86 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Thomas F .  
Green, Jr., Federal Jurisdiction over Counterclaims, 48 Nw. U. L. REV. 271, 283 (1953). 
l4 89 F.3d at 385. 
l5 358 F.3d at 213. 
l 6  Channell, 89 F.3d at 385. The court in Channell relied on its decision in Baer, 72 
F.3d at 1298-1301, where it held that " 5  1367 has extended the scope of supplemental 
jurisdiction, as the statute's language says, to the limits of Article 111-which means that '[a] 
loose factual connection between the claims' can be enough, quoting from Ammerman v. 
Sween, 54 F.3d 423,424 (7th Cir.1995)." 
See Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 15 (1976) (noting the established principle that 
federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction). 
I s  Constitutional authority comes from U.S. CONST art. 111, $ 2, which enumerates 
categories over which there is federal judicial power. These categories are the outer limits of 
jurisdiction, and it is up to Congress to grant the federal courts specific subject matter 
jurisdiction. The most common statutes are 28 U.S.C. 5 1331 (2000), which gives the court 
jurisdiction over cases involving federal questions, and 28 U.S.C. 5 1332 (2000), which 
gives the court subject matter jurisdiction over cases involving diversity. 
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there is a claim that is related to the main claim, but over which there is no 
subject matter jurisdiction.19 In order to enable the federal courts to hear those 
related claims, the courts created the doctine of supplemental jurisdiction to 
allow litigants to resolve all aspects of a controversy in a single proceeding.20 
Without supplemental jurisdiction, a plaintiff in federal court could not 
assert an additional related state law claim if that state law claim did not have 
an independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction. Similarly, a defendant 
would not be able to assert counterclaims or third party claims unless there was 
independent subject matter jurisdiction for those claims, even if those claims 
were related to the plaintiffs original claim. The court-created doctrine, and the 
subsequent codification of that doctrine, permits those claims to be heard. In 
addition, supplemental jurisdiction promotes fairness and judicial economy, 
and complements the liberal joinder rules of the Federal Rules of Civil 
~rocedure.~'  
A. Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. j 1367 
On December 1, 1990, Congress enacted the supplemental jurisdiction 
statute as part of the federal Judicial Improvements Act of 1 9 9 0 . ~ ~  In so doing, 
Congress codified and changed the court-created doctrine. Supplemental 
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 5 1367 permits the federal courts to exercise 
subject matter jurisdiction over -additional claims against existing parties, as 
well as claims against new parties to the action, where there is no original 
subject matter juri~diction.~~ Subject to certain specific exceptions,24 a district 
court hearing claims over which there is original jurisdiction shall have 
supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that "form part of the same case 
or controversy under Article I11 of the United States Constitution" as the 
original claim.25 In codifying the common law of supplemental jurisdiction, the 
19 See Washington Int'l Ins. Co. v. Victoria Sales Corp., No. 87 Civ. 71 10 (WW), 1989 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8306, at *10-11 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 1989); Alumax Mill Prods., Inc. v. 
Cong. Fin. Corp., 912 F.2d 996, 1002-07 (8th Cir. 1990); Carey v. E.I. duPont de Nemours 
& Co., 209 F. Supp. 2d 641,649 (M.D. La. 2002); Soranno v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., No. 96 C 
7882,2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7539, at *4-5 (N.D. 111. May 31,2000). 
20 See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). See also infra note 
101. 
21 Denis F. McLaughlin, The Federal Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute-A 
Constitutional And Statutory Analysis, 24 h z .  ST. L.J. 849, 864 (1992). 
22 Pub. L. No. 101-650, $ 310(a), 104 Stat. 5089, 51 13 (codified as amended at 28 
U.S.C. $ 1367 (2000)); see also McLaughlin, supra note 21 (a comprehensive examination 
of the supplemental jurisdiction statute). 
23 28 U.S.C. $ 1367(a) (2000) codified the authority for the extension of jurisdiction 
that the Court believed was lacking in Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989). It 
overrules Finley by expressly providing that supplemental jurisdiction will include pendent 
party claims. 
24 Supplemental jurisdiction is available except as restricted by $ 1367(b) or $ 1367(c), 
or as expressly negated by another federal statute. Section 1367(b) codified the holding in 
Owen Equipment & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978), which prohibits 
courts from exercising jurisdiction over parties joined by the plaintiff when it would defeat 
diversity jurisdiction. 
25 28 U.S.C. 5 1367(a). 
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legislature did away with the doctrines of pendent arty juri~diction;~ pendent 
claim jurisdiction," and ancillary jurisdiction!8 and created the term 
supplemental jurisdiction. In addition, 8 1367 codified the Supreme Court's 
holding in United Mine Workers v. ~ i b b s , ~ '  by giving the federal court the 
discretion3' to hear a state law claim if the state claim arises out of the same 
case or controversy 31 as a claim that has original subject matter jurisdiction. 
B. The Meaning of "Same Case or Controversy" in f 1367(a) 
Section 1367(a) provides that a district court hearing claims over which it 
has original jurisdiction shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other 
claims that "form part of the same case or controversy under Article 111 of the 
United States ~onst i tu t ion"~~ as the original claim. The meaning of "same case 
or controversy" is somewhat unsettled. The text of the statute is.unambiguous 
and extends jurisdiction to the limits of Article 111.~~ The legislative history of 
the section demonstrates that Congress viewed the test enunciated by the 
Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. ~ i b b s ~ ~  as expressing those 
constitutional limits.35 In Gibbs, the Court held that federal courts have 
jurisdiction over state law claims that "derive from a common nucleus of 
operative fact" such that "the relationship between. . . [the federal] claim and 
the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court 
26 Pendent party jurisdiction allowed additional parties to enter the lawsuit where there 
was no independent subject matter jurisdiction. The United States Supreme Court essentially 
eliminated pendent party jurisdiction in Finley, 490 U.S. at 556, where the Court held that 
federal courts could not entertain claims over additional parties without an independent basis 
of subject matter jurisdiction over the claim. 
27 Pendent claim jurisdiction was generally limited to the ability of a plaintiff to bring a 
state law claim as "pendent" to a claim that arose under federal law, usually under federal 
question jurisdiction. Such claims were allowed even when there was no independent 
subject matter jurisdiction over the state claims if the state and federal claims "derive[d] 
from a common nucleus of operative fact." United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 
725 (1 966). 
28 The doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction was usually used to support claims interposed 
by parties other than the plaintiff, and was usually used in diversity of citizenship suits, 
where there was no independent subject matter jurisdiction over those claims. See Owen 
Equip. & Erection Co., 437 U.S. at 377. 
29 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
30 28 U.S.C. 8 1367(c) (2000) codifies the discretionary step in Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 726. 
Courts may refuse to exercise supplemental jurisdiction on a case-by-case basis. 
31  28 U.S.C. 5 1367(a). 
'* Id. 
33 Id. 
34 383 U.S. 715 (1966). 
35 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 29 n.15 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 
6375 n.15 ("In so doing, [§ 13671 subsection (a) codifies the scope of supplemental 
jurisdiction first articulated by the Supreme Court in United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 
U.S. 715 (1966)."). 
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comprises but one constitutional 'case."'36 The federal courts have consistently 
interpreted "case or controversy" by applying the Gibbs test.37 
There have been commentators, however, who have suggested that the 
meaning of "case or controversy" may be broader than the Gibbs test.38 These 
commentators urge that the constitutional test of a "case or controversy" under 
Article I11 does not require the factual connection between the underlying claim 
and the joined claim delineated in ~ i b b s . ~ ~  Therefore, Congress could not, by 
creating 5 1367(a), provide an independent limitation on supplemental 
jur isdi~t ion.~~ 
For a federal court to exercise supplemental jurisdiction under 5 1367(a) 
tht supplemental claim must fall within the same "case or controversy" as the 
main claim. But it remains unclear whether the Gibbs "common nucleus of 
operative facts" test provides the outer limits of an Article I11 "case or 
controversy" or whether the test is broader and does not require such a factual 
relationship. The issue involving supplemental jurisdiction over permissive 
counterclaims arises when the counterclaim arises from the same "case or 
controversy" as the underlying claim, but the relationship between the joined 
claim and the underlying claim does not rise to the level that would make the 
counterclaim compulsory. Even if the outer limits of "case or controversy" are 
36 Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725. 
37 See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349 (1988); Republic of the 
Philippines v. Marcos, 862 F.2d 1355, 1359 (9th Cir. 1988); Arnold v. ~ i m b e r l ~  Quality 
Care Nursing Sem., 762 F. Supp. 1182, 1186 (M.D. Pa. 1991); Am. Foresight of 
Philadelphia, Inc. v. Fine Arts Sterling Silver, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 656, 662 (E.D. Pa. 1967); 
Trs. of the Colo. Pipe Indus. Employee Benefit Funds v. Colo. Springs Plumbing & Heating 
Co., 388 F. Supp. 71, 74 (D. Colo. 1975). 
38 See William A. Fletcher, "Common Nucleus of Operative Fact" and Defensive Set- 
O@ Beyond the Gibbs Test, 74 IND. L.J. 171 (1998); Richard A. Matasar, Rediscovering 
"One Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejection of the Gibbs Test for 
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1401, 1463 (1983). 
39 Matasar, supra note 38 at 1463. "[Sleveral courts, including the Supreme Court, have 
upheld supplemental jurisdiction in many ancillary jurisdiction cases that do not meet the 
Gibbs fact relationship requirements. . . . Their existence undermines the conclusion that 
Gibbs sets any constitutional limits on supplemental jurisdiction based upon fact relatedness 
of claims." After analyzing the role of supplemental jurisdiction in a diverse range of cases 
addressing issues such as property, receiverships, aggregation of claims to meet amount in 
controversy, and set-off defenses, Professor Matasar concludes that "[a] review of well- 
established supplemental jurisdiction cases reveals that the only constitutional limit to 
supplemental jurisdiction is the presence of a nonfederal claim in the same 'case' or 
'controversy' as a federal claim, and that a 'case' or 'controversy' is measured by federal 
procedural rules." Id. at 1463-75, 1491; see also Fletcher, supra note 38, at 177 (Citing the 
myth of the factual relationship in the historical context, Professor Fletcher offers that "[ilt is 
quite clear that civil cases and controversies in the then-contemporary practice could involve 
adjudication of claims arising out of unrelated facts, both in English and American courts, as 
they did in entertaining unrelated counterclaims for defensive set-off beginning in the early 
1700s."). 
40 Congress cannot give the federal courts broader subject matter jurisdiction than is 
allowed by the United States Constitution. It can only regulate subject matter jurisdiction. 13 
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE 5 3522 (2d ed. 1984); Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 
541 (1986). 
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broader than the Gibbs test, the counterclaim may fall within the more narrow 
view. 
111. SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER COUNTERCLAIMS 
Among other things, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide 
procedural authorization for the joinder of claims4' and parties42 in federal 
court. This is different from jurisdictional authorization-Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 82 specifically states that "[tlhese rules shall not be construed to 
extend. . . the jurisdiction of the United States district courts."43 Therefore, for 
a federal court to hear a joined claim, there must be a procedural rule that 
allows the joinder, as well as a jurisdictional basis through independent 
jurisdiction or through supplemental jurisdiction. 
A. The Dlference Between Compulsory and Permissive Counterclaims 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) is the compulsory counterclaim rule. 
It requires a defendant to plead any counterclaim that "arises out of the 
transaction or occurre~ce" that forms the basis of the plaintiffs claim.44 A 
party who fails to plead a compulsory counterclaim cannot raise that claim in a 
subsequent action.45 If the counterclaim does not arise out of the same 
"transaction or occurrence" then it is a permissive counterclaim and is 
governed by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 3 ( b ) . ~ ~  The failure to plead a 
permissive counterclaim will not bar the defendant from asserting it in a later 
action. Whether a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive, therefore, depends 
on interpretation of the phrase "same transaction or occurrence." 
The courts have not specifically defined this phrase, but have instead 
created tests to determine if a counterclaim is compulsory or permissive.47 In 
the most common test, courts .have held that the requirement of "same 
transaction or occurrence" is met when there is a "logical relationship" between 
41 FED. R. CIV. P. 18. 
42 FED. R. CIV. P. 19. 
43 FED. R. CIV. P. 82. 
" FED. R. CIV. P. 13(a). 
45 The rule itself does not explain the consequences of failure to plead a compulsory 
counterclaim. The courts have generally held that the failure to plead results in a bar under 
the doctrine of res judicata. 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY 
KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE $1417 (2d ed. 1990). 
46 FED. R. CIV. P. 13(b). 
47 See, e.g., Adamson v. Dataco Derex, Inc., 178 F.R.D. 562, 564 (D. Kan. 1998) 
(holding that "a counterclaim is compulsory if: (1) the issues of fact and law raised by the 
claim and counterclaim are largely the same; (2) res judicata would bar a subsequent suit on 
defendant's claim absent the compulsory counterclaim rule; (3) substantially the same 
evidence supports or refutes plaintiffs claims as well as defendant's counterclaim; and (4) 
there is a logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim."); see also Fox v. 
Maulding, 112 F.3d 453, 457 (10th Cir. 1997); Pipeliners Local Union No. 798 v. Ellerd, 
503 F.2d 1193, 1198 (10th Cir. 1974). 
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the counterclaim and the main claim.48 In applying this test, courts look to see 
if the essential facts of the claims are so related that "considerations of judicial 
economy and fairness dictate that all the issues be resolved in one law~uit."~ 
Some courts have held that the test is whether the issues of fact and law on 
the counterclaim are the same.50 This test has been criticized as unworkable, 
because it is impossible to know what the issues will be until after the plaintiff 
has replied to the c~unterclaim.~' A third test in distinguishing a permissive 
counterclaim from a compulsory counterclaim is whether the counterclaim 
would be barred by res judicata if there were no compulsory counterclaim 
rule.52 Absent a compulsory counterclaim rule, however, a pleader is never 
barred from suing independently on a claim that he refrained from pleading in a 
prior action.53 A fourth test suggested by some courts is whether the same 
evidence will support both the original claim and the c~unterc la im.~~ Although 
it is easy to see why a counterclaim would be compulsory if the same evidence 
supports it and the original claim, it is not as easy to see why a counterclaim 
would not be compulsory when it arises from the same facts even if the 
evidence supporting it is different.55 
A permissive counterclaim, therefore, is a counterclaim that does not 
satisfy the compulsory counterclaim tests enunciated by the courts. Such is the 
case when the essential facts for proving the counterclaim and the underlying 
claim are not so closely related that resolving the issues in one lawsuit is 
integral to judicial economy.56 The relationship between the main claim and the 
48 The phrase "logical relationship," in the context of counterclaims, was first used by 
the Supreme Court in Moore v. N. Y. Cotton Exchange., 270 U.S. 593,610 (1926). In Moore, 
the Court was dealing with former Equity Rule 30, the predecessor to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 13(a). The Court stated that when a counterclaim arises out of a transaction which 
is the subject matter of the suit, "'[t]ransaction' is a word of flexible meaning. It may 
comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not so much upon the immediateness 
of their connection as upon their logical relationship." Id.; see also United States v. 
Aquavella, 615 F.2d 12,22 (2d Cir. 1979); Xerox Corp. v. SCM Corp., 576 F.2d 1057, 1059 
(3d Cir. 1978); Valencia v. Anderson Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278, 1291 (7th Cir. 1980), rev 'd 
on other grounds, 452 U.S. 205 (198 1). 
49 Critical-Vac Filtration Corp. v. Minuteman Int'l, Inc., 233 F.3d 697, 699 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
50 Nachtman v. Crucible Steel Co. of Am., 165 F.2d 997,999 (3d Cir. 1948). 
5' CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 568 (6th ed. 
2002). 
52 Big Cola Corp. v. World Bottling Co., 134 F.2d 718,723 (6th Cir. 1943). 
53 Painter v. Harvey, 673 F. Supp. 777,781 (W.D. Va. 1987); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF JUDGMENTS $22  cmt. a (1982). 
54 Non-Ferrous Metals Inc. ,v. Saramar Aluminum Co., 25 F.R.D. 102, 105 (N.D. Ohio 
1960). 
55 For example, in a suit to void an insurance policy for fraud with a counterclaim for 
the amount of the loss, the evidence of the fraud will be different from the evidence of the 
loss and the amount, yet there should only be one suit to settle this controversy between the 
parties. 
See, e.g., Whigham v. Beneficial Fin. Co. of Fayetteville, 599 F.2d 1322, 1323 (4th 
Cir. 1979) (looking at the differences between permissive and compulsory counterclaims). 
Heinonline 9 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 302 2005 
20051 DEFINING THE LIMITS OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION 303 
joined claim is not "logical" or is not supported by the same e~idence.~'  Yet, a 
permissive counterclaim may still have facts in common with the main 
B. Supplemental Jurisdiction over Counterclaims Before 28 U.S.C. f 1367 
Prior to the codification of 28 U.S.C. 9 1367, permissive counterclaims 
clearly needed independent subject matter jurisdiction, while compulsory 
counterclaims did not. In Moore v. New York Cotton ~ x c h a n ~ e , ~ ~  the Supreme 
Court held that a compulsory counterclaim that arose out of the transaction or 
occurrence that was the subject matter of the opposing claim could be heard by 
the federal court even if it did not have independent subject matter jurisdiction. 
This continued to be the law throughout the development of the court-created 
doctrine of supplemental j~risdiction.~' A counterclaim that arises out of the 
same transaction or occurrence as the main claim, and is therefore 
compulsory,61 also falls within the "common nucleus of operative facts" test 
enunciated in Gibbs. 
A permissive counterclaim, however, required independent jurisdiction. 
The origin of this doctrine is in Marconi Wireless Telegraph Co. of America v. 
National Electric Signaling C O . , ~ ~  which involved Equity Rule 30, the 
predecessor to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) and 13(b) .~~  In Marconi, 
the Court stated in dictum that independent jurisdiction was necessary for 
permissive  counterclaim^.^^ 
Most of the early cases coming out of the federal courts observed that "it 
seems to be accepted that a permissive counterclaim. . . is not ancillary and 
57 See generally 3 JMS WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE $8 I 3.01- 
13.33 (3d ed. 2004); 6 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & MARY KAY LINE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE $$ 1401-1430 (2d ed. 1990); John E. Kennedy, 
Counterc[aims Under Federal Rule 13, 1 l HOUS. L. REV. 255 (1973); Charles Alan Wright, 
Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim Under Modern Pleading, 38 PUIINN. L. REV. 
423 (1954). 
58 See Michael D. Conway, Comment, Narrowing the Scope of Rule 13(a), 60 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 141, 152 (1993); Plant v. Blazer Fin. Sews., Inc., 598 F.2d 1357, 1360 (5th Cir. 
1979) (discussing a split among the courts about whether the relationship between a truth-in- 
lending claim and a debt counterclaim pose different issues of law and fact). 
59 270 U.S. 593,609 (1926). 
60 United States v. Eastport S.S. Corp., 255 F.2d 795, 805 (2d Cir. 1958); Chemetron 
Corp. v. Cewantes, 92 F.R.D. 26, 29 (D.P.R. 1981); Hosp. Bldg. Co. v. Trs. of Rex Hosp., 
86 F.R.D. 694,695 (E.D.N.C. 1980). 
Eastport S.S. Corp., 255 F.2d at 804 ("A counterclaim is compulsory under Rule 
17(a) of the Court of Claims only if 'it arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the 
subject matter of the petition."'). 
62 206 F. 295 (E.D.N.Y. 1913) (involving former Equity Rule 30, the predecessor to 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) and 13(b)); see also Green, supra note 13, at 283. 
63 The second paragraph of Equity Rule 30 had two parts, one dealing with what we 
would now call compulsory counterclaims, which "aris[e] out of the transaction which is the 
subject matter of the suit," and one dealing with what we would now call permissive 
counterclaims, which "might be the subject of an independent suit in equity." Marconi 
Wireless Tel. Co., 206 F. at 297. 
206 F. at 299-301. For a discussion on Marconi and how later courts just adopted 
this dictum, see Green, supra note 13, at 283. 
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requires independent grounds of juri~diction."~~ In 1974, the Supreme Court 
stated that "if a counterclaim is compulsory, the federal court will have 
ancillary jurisdiction over it even though ordinarily it would be a matter for 
state Other courts have inferred from this statement that if a 
counterclaim is permissive, ancillary jurisdiction is not a ~ a i l a b l e . ~ ~  Although 
commentators challenged the independent 'urisdiction requirement,68 it 
remained the law for permissive counterclaims.d9 In 1990, however, the court- 
created doctrine was displaced by 28 U.S.C. $ 1367, and a new interpretation of 
supplemental jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims was born. 
IV. THE CIRCUIT COURTS SPEAK: CHANNELL v. CITICORP NATIONAL 
SERVICES, INC. AND JONES v. FORD MOTOR CREDIT CO. 
In 1996, the Seventh Circuit decided Channell v. Citicorp National 
Services, ~ n c . ~ '  In Channell, the plaintiffs were a certified class comprised of 
persons whose automobile leases had been assigned and terminated by the 
defendant. There was also a sub-class of lessees where the terminations were 
inv~luntary.~' The plaintiffs brought an action in district court against the 
defendant for violating the Consumer Leasing Act by charging a substantial 
early termination charge.72 The defendant counterclaimed, seeking a judgment 
for the contractual termination The district court determined that 
this was a permissive c~unterclaim,~~ and because there was no independent 
65 Lesnik v. Pub. Indus. Corp., 144 F.2d 968,976 n. 10 (2d Cir. 1944); see also Princess 
Fair Blouse, Inc. v. Viking Sprinkler Co., 186 F. Supp. 1, 4 (M.D.N.C. 1960); McKnight v. 
Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co., 20 F.R.D. 563, 564 (N.D.W. Va. 1957); Tel. Delivery 
Serv. v. Florists Tel. Serv., 12 F.R.D. 342,343 (S.D.N.Y. 1952). 
Baker v. Gold Seal Liquors, Inc., 417 U.S. 467,469 n.1 (1974). 
67 Maddox v. Ky. Fin. Co., 736 F.2d 380, 382 (6th Cir. 1984); see also Hartford 
Accident & Indem. Co. v. Sullivan, 846 F.2d 377,381 (7th Cir. 1988). 
See Green, supra note 13, at 283.(arguing that the doctrine emerged from dicta and 
did not make sense in terms of saving court time); see also United States v. Heyward- 
Robinson Co., 430 F.2d 1077, 1088 (2d Cir. 1970) (Friendly, J., concurring) (rejecting the 
independent jurisdiction doctrine, being persuaded by Professor Green's article, and noting 
that the doctrine does not serve judicial efficiency). 
69 But see Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 990 (3d Cir. 1984) 
(rejecting the view that independent jurisdiction is required for all permissive counterclaims, 
and instead finding that "the determination that a counterclaim is permissive within the 
meaning of Rule 13 is not dispositive of the constitutional question whether there is federal 
jurisdiction over that counterclaim"). 
70 89 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1996). 
71 Id. at 381. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 384. 
74 Id. at 384-85 (basing its finding that the counterclaim was permissive on Valencia v. 
Anderson Bros. Ford, 617 F.2d 1278 (7th Cir. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, 452 U.S. 205 
(1981), which held that an attempt to collect the balance of a consumer loan is a permissive 
counterclaim). 
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subject matter jurisdiction over the permissive co~nterc la im,~~ the court 
dismissed the c~unterclaim.~~ 
The Seventh Circuit vacated the judgment dismissing the counterclaim, 
holding that the codification of $ 1367 requires courts to use the language of 
the statute to define the extent of their powers.77 The court found that $ 1367 
extends the scope of supplemental jurisdiction to the limits of Article 111, which 
means that a "loose factual connection between the claims can be enough."78 
The court opined that the distinction between compulsory and permissive 
counterclaims served an important function when every assertion of ancillary 
jurisdiction was of doubtful propriety because the parties were afraid not to 
assert a counterclaim and risk its forfeitu~-e.79 In applying $ 1367(a), the court 
found that the facts of the counterclaim were closely related enough to bring it 
within the outer limits of "same case or controversy."80 Therefore, the court 
found that the permissive counterclaim fell within the reach of supplemental 
jurisdiction. The court noted that $ 1367(c) allows the courts to decline to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction under certain circ~rnstances.~~ Because the 
application of those factors involves the discretion of the district court, the 
court ultimately remanded the case.82 
In Jones v. Ford Motor Credit C O . , ~ ~  plaintiffs, both individually and as a 
class, brought an action against the defendant for racial discrimination under 
the Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) .~~  The defendant counterclaimed for 
the amount of the plaintiffs' unpaid car loans.85 The plaintiffs moved to dismiss 
the counterclaim, and the district court granted the motion on the ground that 
the counterclaims were permissive, and as state law claims, had no independent 
subject matter jur isdi~t ion.~~ 
The Second Circuit agreed with the district court that the counterclaims 
were permissive, finding that "[tlhe essential facts for proving the 
counterclaims and the ECOA claim are not so closely related that resolving 
75 Channell, 89 F.3d at 384 (finding that there was no independent subject matter 
jurisdiction over the permissive counterclaim because some of the plaintiff class members 
were not of diverse citizenship from the defendant, and therefore the complete diversity rules 
were not satisfied). 
76 Id. at 385. 
77 Id. 
" Id. (citing Baer v. First Options of Chicago, Inc., 72 F.3d 1294, 1298-1301 (7th Cir. 
1995)) (internal quotations omitted). 
79 Id. 
Id. at 386. 
Id. 
82 Id. at 387. 
83 358 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004). 
84 Id. at 207. 
Id. 
86 Id. at 208. The district court did express some uncertainty as to whether permissive 
counterclaims still required independent subject matter jurisdiction under 5 1367(a). The 
court ruled that if there were supplemental jurisdiction, the court would still dismiss the 
counterclaims under the discretionary elements available in 1367(c). 
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both sets of issues in one lawsuit would yield judicial efficiency."87 Agreeing 
with the rationale of the Seventh Circuit, the Second Circuit held that "[alfter 
section 1367, it is no longer sufficient for courts to assert, without any reason 
other than dicta or even holdings from the era of judge-created ancillary 
jurisdiction, that permissive counterclaims require independent [subject matter] 
jurisdicti~n."~~ The court found that the facts surrounding the defendant's 
counterclaims and the main ECOA claim had enough of a loose factual 
connection to satisfy the "same case or controversy" requirement of Article 111, 
and therefore 5 1367, even if the relationship was not enough to make the 
counterclaim compulsory.89 That loose factual connection was that both the 
ECOA claim and the debt collection claims arose from the plaintiffs' decisions 
to purchase the defendant's cars.90 After holding that the permissive 
counterclaim was subject to supplemental jurisdiction under 5 1367(a), the 
court then remanded the case to the district court so that it could consider the 
discretionary factors in 3 1367(c). 
V. 28 U.S.C. 5 1367 ALLOWS SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION OVER 
PERMISSIVE COUNTERCLAIMS 
The circuit courts are correct in their conclusions that permissive 
counterclaims can be subject to supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 5 
1367. When Congress codified pendent claim, pendent party, and ancillary 
jurisdiction, the resulting statute displaced the existing case law.91 The new 
statute extended supplemental jurisdiction to the constitutional limitation of 
kase or controversy" under Article III.'~ Therefore, the line of decisions 
holding that a permissive counterclaim requires independent jurisdictional 
grounds is no longer good law. 
In creating 5 1367(a), Congress gave district courts supplemental 
jurisdiction over all claims that are so related to the original jurisdiction claims 
that they form part of the same case or controversy within Article 111. Congress 
neither defined the constitutional limit of Article 1 1 1 ~ ~  nor provided a definition 
of the relationship that is needed between the original claim and the 
supplemental claim for jurisdiction to attach. The Federal Courts Study 
proposed that Congress adopt a "same transaction or occurrence" 
-- - - 
Id. at210. 
Id. at 212-13. 
'' Id. at213-14. 
Id. at214. 
See infra Part 1I.A. 
92 28 U.S.C. $ 1367(a) (2000). 
93 It is the fimction of the Supreme Court, and not Congress, to define the limits of 
Article I11 power. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-75 (1803). 
94 Congress created this Committee in 1988 to conduct a comprehensive study of the 
federal judicial system. The Committee was directed to examine problems and issues 
currently facing the courts of the United States and develop a long-range plan for the future 
of the federal judiciary. Judicial Improvement and Access to Justice Act, Pub. L. No. 100- 
702, 5 102(b)(l), (2), 102 Stat. 4626,4644 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. $ 331 (2000)). 
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test to define that relationship;5 but Congress did not. Instead, a plain reading 
of the statute extends supplemental jurisdiction to the full constitutional limit of 
Article 111.'~ 
The legislative history of the statute does state, however, that $ 1367(a) 
codifies the "scope of supplemental jurisdiction first articulated by the Supreme 
Court in United Mine Workers v. ~ibbs."" In Gibbs, the Court found that for 
supplemental jurisdiction to attach, "the state and federal claims must derive 
from a common nucleus of operative fact."98 As a result, many courts and 
commentators have determined that this test is the constitutional limit of 
supplemental j u r i sd i c t i~n .~~  Others have argued, however, that the 
constitutional limit is even broader, and that a single case or controversy 
consists of all claims that bear a loose factual relationship to the claim on which 
there is original subject matter j u r i sd i c t i~n . '~~  Either way, it is clear that there is 
no need for an identical factual relationship between the two claims in order for 
the courts to have the power to entertain supplemental jurisdi~tion. '~' 
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explain the rationale for the 
difference between permissive and compulsory counterclaims. The word 
"shall" in Rule 13(a) was used to indicate that a failure to plead the 
counterclaim would result in its loss in a later lawsuit.Io2 Therefore, if the 
defendant's counterclaim arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, it 
must be pleaded as long as it is within the jurisdiction of the court. Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 13(a) provides the procedure, but it does not address 
the courts' jurisdictional power to hear the claim.Io3 The purpose of 
distinguishing between permissive and compulsory counterclaims is to make 
The Committee recommended over 100 changes to the federal courts, including the 
recommendation that Congress formally authorize supplemental jurisdiction. 
95 FED. COURTS TUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS TUDY C O M M I ~ E  47 
(April 2,1990). 
96 See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Gennain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (plain meaning of 
the statute has priority in interpreting the statutory language). 
'' H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 29 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875. 
98 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,725 (1966). 
99 Mendoza v. Zirkle Fruit Co., 301 F.3d 1163, 1174 (9th Cir. 2002); CFSC 
Consortium, LLC v. Ferreras-Goitia, 198 F. Supp. 2d 116, 124 (D.P.R. 2002); see also 
Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 349 (1988); Deena Godshall Roth, Note, 
Finley v. United States: Is Pendent Party Jurisdiction Still A Valid Doctrine? 39 AM. U. L. 
REV. 811, 818 (1990). 
loo Fletcher, supra note 38, at 171 (citing the example of an unrelated defensive set-off 
claim and arguing "that the constitutional test for supplemental jurisdiction is broader than 
the 'common nucleus of operative fact' test of United Mine Workers v. Gibbs"). 
lo' See Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 610 (1926) (finding that it does not 
matter that the facts supporting the supplemental and original claims are not identical 
because "[tlo hold otherwise would be to rob this branch of the rule of all serviceable 
meaning, since the facts relied upon by the plaintiff rarely, if ever, are, in all particulars, the 
same as those constituting the defendant's counterclaim"); see also Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724- 
25 (requiring that supplemental and original jurisdiction "be little more than the equivalent 
of different epithets to characterize the same group of circumstances" is "unnecessarily 
grudging") (internal quotations omitted). 
'02 FED. R. CIV. P. 13, Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules-1937. 
'03 Green, supra note 13, at 286. 
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sure that compulsory counterclaims are pleaded, not to deal with juri~diction."~ 
There is no basis to conclude that the test that differentiates a compulsory 
counterclaim from a permissive counterclaim is the same test that differentiates 
jurisdiction from lack of jurisdiction. Rather, Congress specifically chose not to 
use the same "transaction or occurrence" langua e of Federal Rule of Civil 
705 Procedure 13(a) in defining the limits of 5 1367(a). 
Under the rules of statutory interpretation, a court may not engage in a 
wholly creative process when it interprets a statute. Rather, it must determine 
and give effect to the intent of the legislature by examining the statutory 
language, the purpose of the legislation, and the le islative hi~tory."~ Under the 
plain meaning rule of statutory interpretation,"' the language in 5 1367 
specifically states "same case or controversy." This language must be 
interpreted the same way it is interpreted in Article I11 of the United States 
Constitution. There is nothing in the legislative history or in the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure that would lead to the conclusion that the language excludes 
permissive counterclaims. Therefore, statutory construction supports the courts' 
decisions in Channel1 v. Citicorp National Services, 1nc.Io8 and Jones v. Ford 
Motor Credit Co. lo9 
The purpose of supplemental jurisdiction is to ensure judicial economy, 
convenience, and fairness to litigants."' It avoids piecemeal litigation and the 
unnecessary litigation of federal questions in federal courts while duplicative 
litigation occurs in state courts as a result of plaintiffs having to split their 
actions. It also promotes the protective purposes of federal jurisdiction by 
giving the plaintiff unimpeded access to the federal courts."' Additionally, it 
permits the federal courts to give full relief by hearing claims that might be lost 
if forced into a different forum."2 Allowing permissive counterclaims, which 
by definition are not part of the same transaction or occurrence as the main 
claim, to fall within the "case or controversy" limit of 5 1367(a) fosters those 
purposes. Supplemental jurisdiction is also consistent with the underlying 
philosophy of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to "entertain[] the broadest 
I" FED. R. CIV. P. 82. 
Io5 H.R. REP. NO. 101-734, at 27-28 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 
6873-74. 
lo' Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, 13 TOURO L. 
REV. 595, 605-07 (1997); Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit 
Union, 457 U.S. 15,22-24 (1982); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 815 (1980). 
lo' See Conn. Nat'l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (plain meaning of 
the statute has priority in interpreting the statutory language). 
log  89 F.3d 379 (7th Cir. 1996). 
lo9 358 F.3d 205 (2d Cir. 2004). 
"O United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) ("Its justification lies in 
considerations of judicial economy, convenience and fairness to litigants."); see also Wright 
v. Associated Ins. Cos., 29 F.3d 1244, 1252 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating general rule is to 
relinquish pendent claims to state courts unless, in an exercise of discretion, the court 
determines that the balance of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity justify 
retention). 
"' See Matasar, supra note 38, at 1404-07 n.6. 
' I 2  See Note, A Closer Look at Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction: Toward a Theory of 
Incidental Jurisdiction, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1935, 1945 (1982). 
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possible scope of action consistent with fairness to the parties.""3 Finally, it 
represents the concept of federal judicial power enunciated by the United States 
Supreme Court in Osborn v. Bank of the United ~ t a t e s " ~  that a federal court 
must be empowered to decide all aspects of an entire controversy if it is to 
function e f fe~ t ive l~ . "~  
Finally, allowing permissive counterclaims to fall within 5 1367(a) is 
further supported by 5 1367(c). Section 1367(c) sets out four grounds under 
which the district court may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction even 
if the claim falls within 5 1367(a).Il6 In exercising its discretion, the district 
court must undertake a case specific analysis.''7 As both the ~ e c o n d " ~  and 
seventh119 Circuits have recognized, even if a permissive counterclaim is 
subject to supplemental jurisdiction, the court still has the discretionary power 
to decline to exercise jurisdiction under 5 1367(c). Therefore, if the court 
determines that the lawsuit has become unwieldy, or that there are 
considerations of federalism or efficiency that warrant dismissal, it can decide 
to decline supplemental jurisdiction over the permissive co~nterclaim. '~~ 
Thus, permissive counterclaims may fall within the broad constitutional 
authority of "case or controversy" under Article I11 under the canons of 
statutory interpretation and under the policies underlying supplemental 
jurisdiction. They fall within that authority whether the courts apply the Gibbs 
"common nucleus of operative fact" test or read "case or controversy" more 
broadly. After determining that permissive counterclaims fall within 5 1367(a), 
the district courts then have statutory discretion to either dismiss or hear the 
counterclaim under 5 1367(c). This approach makes much more sense than 
imposing constitutional restrictions on permissive counterclaims without any 
precedent or authority. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Even before the creation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
federal courts have always required independent subject matter jurisdiction for 
permissive counterclaims before those counterclaims could be heard.12' Unlike 
Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 724. 
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). 
'I5 McLaughlin, supra note 21, at 91 1. 
The section states that the district court may decline to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over a claim under subsection (a) if the claim raises a novel or complex area of 
state law, the claim substantially predominates over the claim over which the district court 
has original jurisdiction, the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original 
jurisdiction, or there are other compelling reasons for declining jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. 8 
1367(c) (2000). For an in-depth discussion of this section, see M. Ashley Harder, Making a 
Federal Case Out of It: Supplemental Jurisdiction Under 28 U.S.C. § 1367, 22 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 67, 103-10 (1992). 
'I7 Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988). 
'I8 Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205,214 (2d Cir. 2004). 
Channel1 v. Citicorp Nat'l Sews., Inc., 89 F.3d 379, 386-87 (7th Cir. 1996). 
Iz0 Harder, supra note 1 16, at 103-1 0. 
''I See Fletcher, supra note 38, at 172-73. 
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compulsory counterclaims, permissive counterclaims did not arise out of the 
same "transaction or occurrence" as the main claim.Iz2 The courts concluded 
that, by definition, permissive counterclaims did not fall within the "common 
nucleus of operative fact" relationship required for supplemental jurisdiction to 
attach. 
In 1990, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. 5 1367, displacing years of court 
created doctrine in the area of supplemental jur isdict i~n. '~~ In the last several 
years, two circuit courts have examined the issue of whether, under the new 
statute, supplemental jurisdiction may be extended to permissive counterclaims. 
These two courts, in Jones v. Ford Motor Credit co.lZ4 and Channel1 v. 
125 Citicorp National Services, Inc., correctly held that $ 1367(a) allows 
supplemental jurisdiction to attach to permissive counterclaims. 
This reading of 28 U.S.C. 5 1367 is correct. Under the rules of statutory 
interpretation, "case or controversy" in 3 1367 includes the full reach of Article 
I11 of the United States ~onst i tu t ion . '~~ Therefore, if a counterclaim is 
permissive-in that it does not fall within the same transaction or occurrence as 
the underlying claim, but it still has a loose factual relationship to the 
underlying claim-it can be subject to supplemental jurisdiction. In addition, 
allowing supplemental jurisdiction to attach to permissive counterclaims fosters 
the purposes of judicial economy and fairness to litigants.lZ7 It cuts down on 
litigation by allowing all claims that are loosely factually related to be heard in 
one lawsuit.128 Finally, the federal courts retain the discretionary power to not 
hear the permissive counterclaim under 5 1367(c) if the courts determine that it 
would be too confusing.'29 
Supplemental jurisdiction is a complex area of the law, and 5 1367 has 
been criticized as being "poorly drafted, creating ambiguity for cases that 
9,130 formerly were clear and creating numerous problems in others. In the area 
of supplemental jurisdiction and permissive counterclaims, however, the 
codification has simplified years of confusing and inaccurate judge-made law. 
By not requiring permissive counterclaims to have independent subject matter 
jurisdiction, Congress is continuing the progress of streamlining the litigation 
process embraced by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 
'22 FED. R. CIV. P. 13(b). 
L23 See supra Part 1I.A. 
L24 358 F.3d 205, 213-14 (2d Cir. 2004). 
lZ5 89 F.3d 379, 385 (7th Cir. 1996). 
12' Jones v. Ford Motor Credit Co., 358 F.3d 205,212 (2d Cir. 2004). 
12' See Ambromovage v. United Mine Workers, 726 F.2d 972, 991 (3'd Cir. 1984) 
(stating that exercising jurisdiction over permissive counterclaims should occur when it 
would improve the judicial economy, be fair to the parties, and further the interests of 
federalism). 
12' See Jones, 358 F.3d at 210-1 1. 
12' 28 U.S.C. Q 1367(c). 
I3O Thomas C. Arthur & Richard D. Freer, Grasping at Burnt Straws: The Disaster of 
the Supplemental Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L.J. 963,964 (1991). 
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